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THE COMPETING INTERESTS

Imagine that you are an "expert" in the complex, and sometimes
convoluted, field of copyright law as it pertains to computer screen displays. Litigation in your area of expertise has been limited to a small
number of cases litigated in the past few years, so you have spent most
of your office time familiarizing yourself with the applicable law and reflecting upon the circumstances of your friends, Joe User and Jack
Creator.
Joe User runs the local hardware store. His personal computer is
vital to his business. He uses the computer to fill out and print invoices,
keep track of inventory, write business correspondence, figure budgets,
and keep financial records. Joe spent hundreds of hours learning how
to operate "Original" (Original) the computer software program he
uses. Joe purchased Originalfrom Major Software Company for $500.
Recently, Joe became aware of "Clone" (Clone), a new software program sold by Small Competitor Company, which has screen displays
and a command menu nearly identical to Original's. However, the program code that creates the screen display in Clone is entirely different
from the corresponding Original program. Cone sells for $50, and is
superior to Original in many respects. Joe is impressed with the possibility of improving his computer system at a low cost, without the need
to learn new command terms. He considers buying Cone.
Jack Creator is the founder and CEO of Major Software Company.
He spent hundreds of hours creating Original,which was considered innovative and extremely useful for performing computing tasks for
small businesses, such as Joe's hardware store. Jack's long hours of
hard work and creativity paid off; his program is a top-seller in the
software industry with annual sales in excess of $1 million. Recently,
however, sales have tailed off and Major is suffering financially. Jack
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suspected the drop in sales was a result of consumers' purchasing the
lower-priced C/one program instead of Original. Following the advice
of his lawyer, Jack Creator sued the makers of Clone, alleging copyright
infringement of Original's screen display.
Will Jack win his lawsuit? Should he? How will future software
purchasers like Joe be affected? How will software manufacturers like
Major Software Company and Small Competitor Company be affected?
II.

THE COPYRIGHT "BASICS"

The example above involving Jack Creator and Joe User illustrates
a classic copyright "balancing" issue. Our founding fathers recognized
the desirability of granting monopoly protection to those who expended
creative energy in the arts and sciences. 1 By guaranteeing that an artist
or writer would receive the benefit of his creative efforts, the drafters
of the Constitution seemingly intended to provide the incentive to create, thereby furthering progress in the arts and sciences. Likewise, our
founding fathers recognized the socially desirable effects of granting the
public access to works in the arts and sciences; if works in the arts and
sciences could be used and improved upon by people other than the
works' creators, progress in the arts and sciences would result. 2 Thus,
the noble goal of copyright is to provide incentive and encourage use,
while balancing the need for protection against the need for competition.3 The example above illustrates that copyright protection is needed
to give Jack Creator the incentive to create a software program. However, granting Jack Creator too much protection would limit the
1.

The Constitution authorizes Congress "[tlo promote the Progress of Science and

useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

2. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), provides an excellent summary of the purpose
of copyright protection. It states:
"[t]he copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration."

Id. at 219. (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)).
However, it is "intended definitely to grant valuable, enforceable rights to authors, publishers, etc., without burdensome requirements; to afford greater encouragement to the production of literary [or artistic] works of lasting benefit to
the world."
Id. (quoting Washingtonian Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939)).
3. See, e.g., Sayre v. Moore, 102 Rev. Rep. 138 (1785) (Lord Mansfield). Sayre contains an often-quoted passage describing the balancing of protection and competition.

Lord Mansfield wrote that:
[We must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one,
that men of ability, who have employed their time for the service of the community, may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward for their ingenuity

and labour; the other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, not
the progress of the arts be retarded.
Id. at 140 n.6.
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software design alternatives Small Competitor Company would be encouraged to create. The end consequence of granting too much protection would be that computer owners, like Joe User, would be denied the
valuable use of inexpensive, improved software. This balancing of use
and incentive, results in the fighting issue in computer display screen
copyright cases: whether screen displays are entitled to copyright protection, and, if they are, whether that protection should be broad or
narrow.
III.

THE ORIGINS OF "LOOK AND FEEL"

The phrase "look and feel" has been used to describe copyright protection which extends beyond protection for verbatim copying. 4 This
definition is somewhat inaccurate, however, because courts have long
held, without using the phrase "look and feel,"5 that, under certain circumstances, copyright protection exists for non-verbatim copying. The
phrase more properly used to describe non-verbatim copyright, as advanced by Professor Nimmer, is "comprehensive, non-literal similarity." 6 When a court undertakes a "look and feel" analysis, it is merely
attempting to determine whether the infringing work is "substantially
similar." "Look and feel" protection is valuable to software companies
that originated popular text-based applications programs because characteristics of the screen display can not be used by competing manufacturers, even though those manufacturers might create programs with
identical, or nearly identical, screen displays using entirely different
program codes. 7 Properly analyzed, the "look and feel" issue initially
involves determining, through application of existing copyright law,
4. See, e.g., Note, A Thousand Clones: The Scope of Copyright Protection in the
"Look and Feel" of Computer Programs,63 WASH. L. REV. 195 (1988) [hereinafter Note, A
Thousand Clones]; Comment, Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc.: "Look and
Feel" Copyright Protectionfor the Display Screens of an Application Computer Program,
13 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 105 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, "Look and Feel'].
5. Interestingly enough, none of the cases that have addressed the "look and feel"
issue have used the phrase "look and feel." The phrases used by the courts include, for
example, "total concept and feel," "structure, sequence and organization," and "sequence
and flow." The phrases used by the courts will be discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 46, 54, 132-33. The phrase "look and feel" apparently is a creature of the
media and commentators, who no doubt found the phrase more "catchy" than those used

by the courts.
6.

3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][1] (1989).

7. Regular users of applications software programs unavoidably become accustomed
to the characteristics of the screen display such as the screen sequence and appearance,
the response time between commands, the types of commands the program uses, the way
the program indicates that the disk drive is running, and the colors and highlighting of
certain text.
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whether computer screen displays are entitled to copyright protection.
If so, the display is protected to the extent of its "look and feel."
IV.

ARE COMPUTER SCREEN DISPLAYS COPYRIGHTABLE?

In order to determine whether computer screen displays are copyrightable, it is necessary to examine the applicable language of the
Copyright Act of 1976 (the "Act"). 8 The Act provides protection for
"original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression."9 The initial inquiry, when applying the Act to computer display
screens, involves examining two copyright concepts that rarely pose
problems in traditional copyright cases: (1) what type of "work" is involved, and (2) whether the work is "fixed." The unique technology
used to create computer display screens prompts questions about
whether the displays are "works of authorship" that can be "fixed" in a
tangible medium of expression.
A.

WORKS OF AUTHORSHIP

The "works" protected by the Act include "literary works,"'10 "audiovisual works,"'" and "compilations."'1 2 Other types of "works" are
protected by the Act, but the three listed above are most commonly
cited in computer display screen copyright cases. The type of "work"
alleged to exist depends upon whether the computer screen display is a
part of a video game or a text-based applications 13 program. Courts
hearing cases involving video game screens have uniformly held that
the display screen is copyrightable as an "audiovisual work."'1 4 However, courts reviewing screen displays that are part of text-based applications programs, have wavered, and have not always found the displays
8. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2598 (current version at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982)).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
10. "Literary works" are expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical
symbols or indicia. Id. § 101.
11. "Audiovisual works" consist of a "series of related images" intended to be shown
by machine or devices, together with accompanying sound. Id. § 101.
12. "Compilations" are formed by collecting and assembling preexisting materials, or
by data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work
as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship. Id. § 101. Section 103 of the Act
limits copyright protection for a compilation to the extent of the author's contribution to
the work. Id. § 103.
13. Text-based applications programs include word processors, databases, spreadsheets, etc.
14. See, e.g., M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 436 (4th Cir. 1986); Atari,
Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 615 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 380 (1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F.Supp. 466, 479 (D.
Neb. 1981).
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to be copyrightable.' 5
The court in ManufacturersTechnologies, Inc. v. CAMS, Inc., designated the screen a "compilation.' u6 Another court, in Digital
Communicationsv. Softklone Distributing,found the screen to be copyrightable either as a "literary work" or a "compilation."'1 7 A third
court, in Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, apparently assumed, without discussion, that the screen was an "audiovisual work."' s
As of this writing, CAMS, Softklone, and Broderbund are the only cases
that have been litigated and that directly address the copyrightability of
text-based, computer application, program screen displays.19 Given the
limited number of courts that have addressed the issue, it is not surprising that variations exist in the characterization of the "work" comprising a screen display. Broad, distinct differences in the appearance of
display screens, however, make application of a uniform "work" charac20
terization inappropriate.
B.

FIXATION

The "fixation" requirement has posed less of a problem for screen
display plaintiffs and courts than the "work" requirement. 2 1 Courts
have recognized that computer display screens are "works of author15. See infra text accompanying notes 16-19.
16. 706 F. Supp. 984, 993 (D. Conn. 1989).
17. 659 F.Supp. 449, 462-63 (N.D. Ga. 1987). The Softklone court held that the display
screens were copyrightable as either a "literary work" or a "compilation." The plaintiff,
however, only asserted that the screens were copyrightable as "compilations." The court
noted that "although it is not dispositive, . . .the Copyright Office granted the plaintiff a
copyright registration on the status screen as a "compilation." Id. at 463. "Compilation,"
of course, merely describes the form which one of the "works of authorship" set out in
the Copyright Act may take. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
18. 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
19. See also Broderbund,648 F. Supp. at 1133 (citing Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental
Lab., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986)) (proposing that "copyright protection is not limited to
the literal aspects of a computer program, but .. .extends to the overall structure of a
program, including its audiovisualdisplays" (emphasis added)). However, as will be discussed infra, text accompanying notes 32-34, Whelan did not so hold.
20. It is inappropriate to designate all screen displays as one type of "work" as is apparent from the screen displays at issue in Broderbund and Softklone. Pictorial illustrations were a central part of the display at issue in Broderbund. Thus, characterizing the
displays as solely a "literary work" or a "compilation" would be inaccurate, and could result in some confusion as to whether protection was intended for the pictorial illustrations. In Softklone, on the other hand, a form-type display, without pictorial illustrations,
was involved. Characterizing the Softklone display as an "audiovisual work" would, likewise, not be proper.
21. A work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression "when its embodiment in a
copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
more than transitory duration." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
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ship" (whether characterized as "audiovisual," "literary," or "compilations"), and that the displays are "fixed" because screen displays are
can be generated from the program
contained in the program code and
22
computer.
a
of
aid
the
with
code
Many issues remain unresolved in the area of computer display
screen copyright. For example, when is there "expression"? When is
the expression "original"? What defenses are available? The preceding
questions are best answered by examining the three cases that have directly addressed the copyrightability of computer application program
display screens, as well as the position of the Copyright Office on the
subject.
V.
A.

1.

CASES

BRODERBUND

Facts

Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World23 was the first case to
directly address the copyrightability of computer applications program
display screens. In 1983, Pixellite Software began developing a computer software program that enabled users to create personalized greeting cards. The recipient needed a computer in order to view the card.
Apparently, recognizing the limited market for greeting cards viewable
solely by computer, Broderbund encouraged Pixellite to change the program so that greeting cards, banners, signs, and posters could be printed
by the user. This eliminated the need for a card recipient to use a computer. Pixellite made the suggested changes, and, within a year,
Broderbund had obtained the exclusive license to distribute the program, called "The Print Shop" (The PrintShop), and began marketing
the program.
Unison sought to make The Print Shop, an Apple program, compatible with IBM computers. Unison began negotiating with Broderbund
in May, 1984, for the conversion rights to The Print Shop. During the
negotiations, Broderbund showed the program code to representatives
from Unison and made it clear to Unison that the IBM version was to
be identical to the Apple version. During the negotiations, Unison began work on its IBM duplicate of The Print Shop.
Eventually, negotiations broke down. At the time of the breakdown, Unison had already completed duplication of a substantial portion of The Print Shop. Unison's software designer went on to finish
The Print Shop duplicate, and, in fact, "enhanced" the program so that
22. M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 442 (4th Cir. 1986).
23. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
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the Unison IBM version had more features than Apple's version.2
In March, 1985, Unison began marketing its IBM version of The
PrintShop under the name "Printmaster" (Printmaster).In May, 1985,
Broderbund and Pixellite sued Unison, alleging copyright infringement.
2. The Opinion
The Broderbund court began its opinion by stating that the
copyrightability of audiovisual displays was the "threshold issue.

' 25

Cit-

26

ing Mazer v. Stein, the court focused on the fundamental copyright
principle that, while expressions of ideas are copyrightable, the ideas
themselves are not. Unison argued that the idea and expression of The
Print Shop had "merged" because there was only one way to express
the idea of a computer program that printed greeting cards. 27 The
plaintiffs produced evidence of another program, "Stickybear Printer"
(Stickybear Printer), which also printed greeting cards, banners, and
posters, but used substantially different menu screens and screen sequences. Because another program was available with the same idea,
but a different manner of expression, the idea and expression were obviously separable. Accordingly, the court held that the merger doctrine
28
was inapplicable.
The lack of case law in the area of computer display screen copyrights forced the Broderbund court to rely upon two cases that had not
24. Id. at 1131.
25. Id.
26. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
27. Broderbund,648 F. Supp. at 1131-32 (citing Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v.
Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971)). The Kalpakian court held that the number of
ways the idea of a "jewel encrusted bee pin" could be expressed was so limited that granting copyright protection to one manufacturer would amount to granting a monopoly. The
idea of a "jewel encrusted bee pin" could not be distinguished from its expression; merger
prevented the plaintiff from prevailing on the infringement claim. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d at
742.
28. One commentator has argued that the Broderbund court incorrectly held that the
substantial similarity between the functions of Stickybear Printer and The Print Shop
meant that the two programs had the same underlying idea. See Comment, "Look and
Feel", supra note 4, at 127. The court's error stems from its failure to recognize that
Stickybear Printerwas a program designed for use by children. The function of the audiovisual display of Stickybear Printerwas to enable children to create and print greeting
cards, etc. The Print Shop audiovisual display, on the other hand, was intended to allow
adults to print greeting cards, etc. It is quite possible that the number of ways an audiovisual display screen may be configured in order to allow an adult to print greeting cards is
just as limited as the number of ways a "jewel encrusted bee pin" may be designed.
If the reasoning advanced by the court in Kalpakian, see supra note 27 and accompanying text, is followed, the court's decision to grant protection for The PrintShop screens
is arguably incorrect. Questions remain, however, regarding the accuracy of the reasoning
employed by the Kalpakian court.
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expressly dealt with the issue. Unison urged the court to follow the
reasoning of Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computer Co.,n
30
which held that a computer's user interface was not copyrightable.
The plaintiffs argued that the reasoning in Whelan Associates, Inc. v.
Jaslow Dental Laboratory,Inc.,3 1 should be followed.
3.

The Whelan Error

In Whelan, the plaintiff designed a program to manage the records
of a dental laboratory. The defendant, a former business associate of
the plaintiff, began marketing a similar program designed for use on a
different type of computer. The court's holding, as it applied to the
computer display screen, was merely that the screen display could serve
as indirect evidence of copying of the program code.3 2 The Broderbund
court, however, held that Whelan stood for the proposition that "copyright protection is not limited to the literal aspects of a computer program, but rather extends to the overall structure of a program,
including its audiovisual displays.133 The court's error touched off a
flurry of criticism from commentators and other courts facing the issue
34
of the copyrightability of computer screen displays.
4.

Other Defenses

Unison also argued that The Print Shop screen displays were ineligible for copyright because no "aesthetic elements" could be separated
from the utilitarian aspects of the screen displays.3 5 The court found
Unison's argument unpersuasive, stating that it was "clear that the
structure, sequence, and layout of the audiovisual displays in [The Print
Shop] were dictated primarily by artistic and aesthetic considerations,
29. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
30. Id. The Synercom court recognized the distinction between the idea underlying a
computer program, and the idea underlying the "user interface" of a computer program.
The case did not involve a display screen, but, instead, involved the input formats of a
statistical analysis program. The court recognized that the idea of the program was the
process of computerization of statistical formulas, while the idea of the input formats was
the ordering and sequencing of data. The court found that the expression of the idea of
the input formats was indistinguishable from the idea; therefore, the formats were not
copyrightable. Id.
31. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
32. Id. at 1244.
33. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1133 (emphasis added).
34. The Softklone and CAMS courts were both critical of the Broderbund court's interpretation of the holding in Whelan. See Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 461-62; CAMS, 706 F.
Supp at 992-93. See also Comment, "Look and Feel", supra note 4, at 129; Note, Copyright Protectionfor Computer Screen Displays, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1123, 1145 (1988); Note,
A Thousand Clones, supra note 4, at 201 n.52 (1988).
35. Broderbund,648 F. Supp. at 1133-34 (citing Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp.,
630 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir. 1980)).
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and not by utilitarian or mechanical ones."' 36 The selection and arrangement of words on the screen was "arbitrary," according to the court,
and thus separable aesthetic elements existed.
Finally, Unison argued that the "rules and instructions" doctrine
prevented Broderbund from copyrighting The Print Shop screen displays. According to that doctrine, "rules and instructions for unprotected games or processes cannot themselves be protected under the
copyright laws."'3 7 Unison characterized its "rules and instructions" defense in the same manner as it had characterized its "merger" defense,38 arguing that when only a limited number of ways existed to do
something, granting copyright protection in the "rules and instructions"
of that process amounted to granting a monopoly on the idea related to
those "rules and instructions." Given the similarity of this argument to
Unison's "merger" argument, it was not surprising that the court reasoned that the existence of Stickybear Printer,a similar program with
39
different rules and instructions, disproved the defendant's argument.
Furthermore, according to the court, the aesthetically pleasing aspects
of The Print Shop menu screens rendered them outside the "rules and
40
instructions" doctrine.
5.

Copying

Having disposed of Unison's defenses, the court next undertook to
determine whether Unison had copied Broderbund's work. The
"circumstantial analysis of copying" was used, which required not only
a finding that Unison had "access" to Broderbund's work, but that there
was also "substantial similarity" between The Print Shop and
41
Printmaster.
The court had no trouble finding access because Unison
possessed several copies of The PrintShop. The court used the two-step
test enunciated in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions,Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp,42 to address substantial similarity. According to the
Broderbund court, the Krofft test requires the application of "(1) an 'extrinsic' test aimed at determining whether there exists a substantial
similarity in underlying ideas; and (2) an 'intrinsic' test to ascertain
whether there exists a substantial similarity in the expression of the
36. Id. at 1134.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1134 (citing Affiliated Hosp. Prods., Inc. v. Merdel Game Mfg. Co., 513 F.2d
1183 (2d Cir. 1975); Decorative Aides Corp. v. Staple Sewing Aides Corp., 497 F. Supp. 154
(S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
39. Id. at 1134.

40. Id.
41. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1162 (9th Cir. 1977).
42. Id. at 1164.

1989]

COPYRIGHT OF COMPUTER DISPLAY SCREENS

427

underlying idea. '43 Under the Krofft court's standards, expert testimony is admissible in the "extrinsic" test; however, the "intrinsic" test
is based solely on how the "ordinary reasonable person" would respond
to the product.44
After reviewing the expert testimony on substantial similarity, the
court found that The Print Shop and Printmasterconsisted of the same
idea, and had virtually identical purposes and uses. Thus, the two
works met the "extrinsic" portion of the Krofft test for substantial similarity.45 As for the "intrinsic" portion of the Krofft test, the court
framed the issue as "whether the infringing work captures the 'total
concept and feel' of the protected work." 46 The court viewed the two
works at trial and, after listing, in detail, some of the similarities it
found, had no difficulty concluding that there was substantial similarity.
Broderbund started the "look and feel" ball rolling, but failed to clearly
define the direction the ball would roll.
B.
1.

SOFTKLONE

Facts

Six months after the Broderbund decision, the issue of copyrightability of computer screen displays arose again, in Digital Communica47
tions v. Softklone Distributing.
In Softklone, the plaintiff, Digital,
owned the rights to "Crosstalk XVI" (CrosstalkXVI), an extremely successful microcomputer telecommunications program developed by
Microstuff in the early 1980s. 48 The defendant, Softklone, was a marketing company which handled "clones" 49 of successful computer
software programs that were created by its parent company, Foretec.
Foretec produced a "clone" of the Crosstalk XVI program called "Mir50
ror" (Mirror)
that Softklone began to market in December, 1985.
Meanwhile, Microstuff had obtained copyright registrations on the
Crosstalk XVI user manual and computer program in October, 1985, but
43. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1136.

44. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
45. See Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1136-37. The court noted that it was obvious,

even without the expert testimony, that The Print Shop and Printmasterwere substantially similar. Id.
46. Id. at 1137 (quoting Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110
(9th Cir. 1970)).
47. 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
48. The Crosstalk XVI program was designed to enable a computer to access information in another computer via phone lines. Id. at 452.

49. "Clone" programs generate identical screen displays and use the same commands
as the original program, but the "clone" screen is generated by an entirely different underlying program. See Note, A Thousand Clones, supra note 4, at 196.
50. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 453.
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did not obtain the first of its two copyright registrations on the display
screens until December, 1985-the same month, Softklone began marketing Mirror.5 1 Mirror performed the same functions as Crosstalk
XVI and had a status screen 52 that was nearly identical to the Crosstalk
XVI status screen. Microstuff sued Softklone, alleging infringement of
the Crosstalk XVI status screen display copyright. Digital became a
party to this action when it purchased Microstuff sometime after the initiation of the suit.
2. The Opinion
First, the Softklone court noted that computer programs are copyrightable as "literary works. '53 Next, the court probed the reasoning of
Whelan, citing the case for the proposition that "the copyright protection of a computer program extends beyond the program's literal souce
and object codes to its 'structure, sequence and organization.' "54 After
noting the Broderbund court's "overexpansive and erroneous reading"
of Whelan,55 the Softklone court concluded that a computer program
copyright does not extend to the screen displays generated by that program. In order for a computer program copyright to protect the screen
display, the court believed the screen display was required to be a
"copy" or "reproduction" of the literary work embodied in the computer program.56 But, because many different programs could produce
the same screen display, the screen was not to be considered a "copy" of
the underlying computer program. On the other hand, because that
program could produce only one screen display, a computer program
was to be considered a "copy" of its screen display. 57 As a result, the
Softklone court would not accept the argument that Digital's computer
program copyright protected the screen and required Digital to establish an alternate means of protecting the Crosstalk XVI status screen.
As its alternate means of protecting the Crosstalk XVI status
screen, Digital relied upon the status screen copyright registrations the
Copyright Office had granted to it. These registrations constituted
51. Id.
52. The Crosstalk XVI status screen listed the operating parameters of the computer
being used. The operating parameters included the data transmission speed and other terminal configurations which must be set in order for the computer to properly connect
with another computer. Id.
53. Id. at 454.
54. Id. at 455.
55. Id.
56. Id. The court's reasoning in this regard is suspect because the screen display and
the program that generates that display are inseparable, as far as the "work of authorship" is concerned. The underlying program was created in order to generate the screen
display, and thus is a part of the "work of authorship" comprising the program.
57. Id. at 456.
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prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright of the status
screens. 8 As a result, Softklone had the burden of coming forth with
evidence of the invalidity of the display screen copyright.59
3. Defenses
Softklone argued that the Crosstalk XVI status screen was not
copyrightable because the screens fell within the Baker v. Selden 6° prohibition of copyright protection for "blank forms" which fail to convey
information themselves, and because the screens were a "necessary expression" of their idea. 61 The court disagreed.
a.

Elements of the status screen as "necessary expression"

In Softklone, the "idea" of the status screen was the process or
manner by which it operated, and the "expression" was the method by
which that idea was communicated to the user. 62 As ideas, the court
listed (1) the use of a screen to reflect the status of a program; (2) the
use of a command-driven program; and (3) the typing of two symbols to
activate a specific command. 63 Aspects of the status screen which were
unrelated to how the screen operated and therefore constituted "expression," included: (1) the arrangement of the parameter/command
terms, and (2) the highlighting and capitalization of two letters in the
command terms.64
58. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1976).
59. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 453 (citing Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts
Corp., 768 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986)).
60. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). In Baker, the plaintiff sought copyright protection for forms
contained in the appendix of several books explaining the plaintiff's new "double-entry
bookkeeping" system. The plaintiff claimed that the system could not be used without
using the plaintiff's forms. The court held that where the idea the plaintiff's book
teaches
cannot be used without employing the methods and diagrams used to illustrate
the book, or such as are similar to them, such methods and diagrams are to be
considered as necessary incidents to the art, and given therewith to the public ...
for the purpose of practical application.
Id. at 103. Baker stands for the proposition that necessary expressions incident to an idea
are not copyrightable, and that blank forms must themselves "convey information" in order to be copyrightable. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 457.
61. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 456-57.
62. Id. at 458. The Softklone court made note of Judge Higginbotham's famous "figure-H gear shift" analogy, put forth in Synercom. Higginbotham stated that the idea of a
"figure-H" for .agear shift pattern was analogous to a computer's "format." In the case of
the gear shift pattern, other automobile manufacturers were free to use the pattern, but
could not copy the expression of the pattern contained in, for example, a driver's manual,
diagram, photograph, driver's training manual, or otherwise. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. 1003,
1013 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
63. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 459.
64. Id.
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Softklone, like the defendant in Broderbund, cited Synercom as
support for its position that the status screen was not copyrightable. 65
The court held that Synercom differed factually because the Synercom
defendant, unlike Softklone, had not copied anything that was purely
irrelevant to the functioning of the program.6 The court further distinguished Synercom by holding that the status screen involved
"considerable stylistic creativity and authorship above and beyond the
sequence of data."'6 7 The court's reasoning in this regard raises several
questions. First, is there such a thing as a text-based applications program consisting merely of the haphazard sequencing of data? Probably
not. If a display screen is to be used as an interface, information must
appear somewhere on the screen. This dictates that the programmer
must decide where to place the information. This raises another question, Is one programmer's view of the proper way to place information
on the screen to be considered more creative than another's? If so, a
basic copyright concept-that artistic merit should not determine
whether a work is copyrightable-is violated. If this concept is not to be
violated, then all display screens that reflect the programmer's decision
regarding where the information should appear on the screen are
copyrightable.
b. Are screen areas copyrightable?
The Softklone court's approach appears to allow copyright of the
positioning of text in a particular area on a display screen. For example, the creator of a word processing program could copyright the "creative expression" embodied in the placement of the document file name
and cursor status line on the bottom line of the screen display. Should
the creator be allowed to obtain such a copyright? Arguably no, because the nature of word processing software is such that the cursor remains at the bottom of the screen most of the time. 68 Otherwise, the
writer would be unable to view what had just been written. Placing the
file name and cursor status line at the bottom of the screen makes it
easier for the user to refer to those two features and, therefore, it is the
"best" way to arrange the screen. All word processing program creators
should be allowed to place a file name, cursor status line, or any other
information they choose, at the bottom of the screen. Software creators
65. Id. at 459-60.
66. Id. at 460.
67. Id.
68. Nearly all word processing programs begin with the cursor in the upper left-hand
corner of the screen. Once the document reaches a length that is longer than what may
be displayed entirely on the screen, the cursor remains at the bottom of the screen as text
is added. An exception to this general characteristic occurs when the writer moves the
cursor to different areas of the screen for editing purposes.
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should not be able to "reserve" certain areas of the screen display for
their own use.

69

According to the court, Digital could copyright the positioning of
the command/parameter terms on the display screen because Softklone
could have arranged the command/parameter terms in a number of different ways without "hampering the operation of the program. '70 Unfortunately, the court overlooked the fact that there is often one "best"
way to arrange information on a computer display screen. Certainly
Softklone could have arranged the command/parameter terms differently, but should it have been forced to do so? The issue boils down to
deciding whether copyright protection is intended to give a developer a
monopoly over the "best," or most efficient way, of expressing an idea.
The Softklone court concluded that copyright protection might, in fact,
result in monopoly.
c.

"Forms" that "convey information?"

Softklone contended that the status screen was a "blank form," and
that it failed to meet the information conveyance requirement of copyright. 71 The court stated that the determination of "whether a work
conveys information must be made on a case-by-case basis." 72 Citing
Whelan and Synercom, the court held that arranging the command
terms under descriptive parameter headings, and capitalizing and highlighting letters of the commands, assisted the user in "knowing which
symbols to enter to activate the various commands. 73s Thus, the status
screen conveyed information.
Softklone also registered a policy-based defense. Standardization in
the computer industry, according to Softklone, was desirable, but would
be hampered by granting copyright protection to screen displays. The
court rejected Softklone's standardization argument, but gave little supportive reasoning for its decision. 74 The reasoning given indicated that
69. The Copyright Office implicitly recognizes the undesirability of allowing software
creators to monopolize a position on the screen through copyright of the arrangement of
text on a screen display. The Office has stated that it "does not register separately textual
screen displays, reasoning that there is no authorship in ideas, or the format, layout or
arrangement of text on the screen,..." Copyright Offie Notice on Computer Screen Registration, 36 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 884, at 152 (1988) [hereinafter
Copyright Office Notice].
70. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 460.
71. See Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 461; Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); 37 C.F.R.
§ 202.1(c) (1988).
72. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 461.
73. Id. at 462.
74. Id. As support for its rejection of Softklone's standardization argument, the court
cited a portion of Whelan where the court stated that "we are not convinced that progress
in computer technology or technique is qualitatively different from progress in other ar-
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the court believed that those who urged standardization in the
computer industry did so solely to promote progress in computer technology by fostering the transferability of information among competitors. However, there is a more compelling reason for standardizing the
computer industry. Computer users and the business community profit
greatly from the ability to transfer skills learned in operating one type
of computer software program to another. For example, if an office
worker has mastered the commands necessary to operate a Brand X
word processing program or spreadsheet, and then is transferred to a
different department, or is hired by a different company, and is required to use Brand Y software, the re-training and adjustment period
is shortened if the screen display and commands used by Brand X and
Brand Y are the same. Thus, for policy reasons such as increasing
worker productivity and ease of consumer use, standardization is a compelling argument. 75 On the other hand, opponents of standardization
argue that software developers will not expend the effort to create new,
76
more useful screen displays if protection is not available.
Reaching a conclusion as to whether standardization should take
place involves a balancing of interests. Is "progress in the arts and sciences" best promoted by providing for transferability of computer skills
from one program to another, or by providing incentive for software developers to create new, well-developed screen displays? The Softklone
decision tips the scale in favor of providing incentive for the creation of
screen displays, and away from the transferability of computer skills.
4. Status Screen as Compilation
Having disposed of Softklone's defenses, the court turned its attention to determining what type of "work" the display screen was. Digital
eas of science or the arts." Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d
1222, 1238 (3d Cir. 1986). However, standardization was not put forth as a defense in

Whelan.
75. A software consultant has estimated that the cost of training a worker to obtain a
minimum level of proficiency of use of the spreadsheet "Lotus 1-2-3" (Lotus 1-2-3) is approximately $1,000 (including both direct costs, and lost time from other work while
training). Wiegner & Heins, Can Las Vegas Sue Atlantic City?, FORBES, Mar. 6, 1989, at
130, 132. Standardization could reduce the training costs by increasing the transferability
of computer skills. Reducing training costs and time would increase productivity. Also,
software manufacturers would have an incentive to keep the functionality of their product ahead of competitors by periodically enhancing the quality of the software. Such an
incentive would exist because in a world where computer display screens are standardized, the functionality of a program would dictate a user's choice of software, rather than
familiarity with a particular display screen. If a user wanted to switch to a different program, he would not be forced to waste time learning a new interface. See Note, A Thousand Clones, supra note 4, at 215.
76. Note, A Thousand Clones, supra note 4, at 214-16.
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urged the court to find that the display screen was either a "compilation," 77 or a "derivative work. 7 8s The court held that the status screen
was designed and arranged prior to the development of the program
code. Therefore, the status screen was not based upon a "preexisting"
work, and was thus not a "derivative work. '79 The court did find, however, that the status screen was "assembled data," arranged in such a
way as to constitute an original 80 work of authorship that fell within
the definition of compilation, and that was copyrightable as such. 8 '
More specifically, the status screen was found to be a compilation, and
thus copyrightable, "to the extent of its arrangment and design of pa8' 2
rameter/command terms.
5. Copying
Softklone admitted access to Digital's works.8 3 As a result, the
court was left solely with the task of determining whether "substantial
similarity" existed between the two works. The court held that substantial similarity existed because "[tihe Mirror status screen captures
the 'total concept and feel' of the Crosstalk XVI status screen. '8 4 Placement of the two status screens side-by-side helped the court determine
that they were nearly identical, and that copying existed.
6. Remedy
The court permanently enjoined the defendants from engaging in,
undertaking, aiding, abetting or facilitating the manufacture, distribution, lease, sale or licensing of any merchandise, goods or articles constituting infringements of the plaintiff's copyright in the Crosstalk XVI
(version 3.6) "Main Menu" (status screen).8 5 The injunction's effect on
77. See supra note 12 (definition of "compilation").

78. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 463. A "derivative work" is defined as a work "based
upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridge-

ment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed or
adapted." Id. In the court's opinion, the status screen was "essentially a 'literary work'
and... copyrightable as such." Id. at 462.
79. Id. at 463.
80. The court found "originality" because the placement, arrangement and design of
the parameter/command terms was "neither arbitrary nor predetermined but, rather,

[was] the result of extensive original human authorship." Id.
81. Id

The court also noted that the Copyright Office had granted a Copyright Regis-

tration on the status screen as a "compilation." Id
82. Id.
83. Id. at 464-65.

84. The Softklone court borrowed the "total concept and feel" test from Sid and
Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir.
1977), and Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
85. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 465.
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the parties and the market for telecommunications software is questionable, considering that four hours after the court handed down its decision, Softklone changed its status screen so that it no longer infringed
86
Digital's, and both brands of software are still being sold.
C.

THE POSITION OF THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE

One problem with the Softklone decision is that, at present, the
Copyright Office will not register a computer display screen separately;
the office maintains that screen protection must come from the program copyright.8 7 The conflicting positions have caused confusion, 8 but
it is doubtful that a court, in the face of the express view of the Copyright Office, would follow the Softklone court's view that a program
copyright does not protect the screen displays.
In June, 1988, the Copyright Office, in response to the confusion
generated by the discrepancy between the Office's position and the Softklone opinion, issued a Notice on Computer Screen Registration.8 9 The
Notice was issued after a public hearing on the subject. The Office
stated in the Notice that screen displays were not registered separately
because "there is no authorship in ideas, or the format, layout or arrangement of text on the screen, and... any literary authorship in the
screen display would presumably be covered by the underlying computer program-itself a literary work."9 The Copyright Office also
noted that the regulations specify that only one registration shall be issued per work.9 '
One reason given by the Office for its position was the need for a
clear, consistent public record, and the undesirability of "piecemeal registration of parts of works."'92 While the proponents of separate screen
86. See Wiegner & Heins, supra note 75, at 133.
87. At the time of the Softklone decision, however, the Copyright Office was granting
separate registrations for display screens. See id.
88. Kenneth Wasch, of the Software Publishers Association, stated that "the court
battles have created a level of uncertainty that has hurt the industry because people
spend their time worrying about what's legal instead of creating new products." Hallisey,
Software Wars: The Look and Feel Battlefield, PC RESOURCE, Mar. 1989, at 46.
89. Copyright Office Notice, supra note 69, at 152.
90. Id.
91. 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(6) (1988). Computer program copyright claimants, when registering, "have the option to include or omit on the registration application any specific
reference to a claim in the computer screen material. If the computer screen material is
specifically claimed, however, then the deposit must include appropriate reproductions of
the screen display." Deposit Rules are Issuedfor Programswith Trade Secrets and Screen
Displays, 37 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 925, at 594 (1989). For text-based
applications programs, "printouts, photographs, or drawings" suffice as deposits, but a
computer manual or VHS videotape do not. Id.
92. Copyright Office Notice, supra note 69, at 153.
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registration asserted that the authorship of the program code is substantially different from the authorship of the screen display, the Copyright
Office rebutted the argument, stating that the program code and screen
display nonetheless are "integrally related and ordinarily form a single
work. '93 A particularly compelling argument advanced by the Office
was that it is common to "merge" several different types of authorship
in a single work, such as a motion picture-a creation considered to be a
single work even though it contains the authorship of writers, directors,
editors, camera operators, etc.4
The Office explained that it sought only to create a clear, accurate
public record, and could not precisely define the scope of protection of
any work, including computer screen displays. 95 According to the Office, its position assists the public and the courts-the ultimate arbiters
of the scope of protection.9
No court has yet been forced to reconcile the Copyright Office position with the Softklone decision, although the CAMS case, which involved screen displays registered prior to the Office's decision to grant a
single registration, suggested a solution to the conflict.9
D.
1.

CAMS

Facts

On January 30, 1989, a third court, in Manufacturers Technologies,
Inc. v. CAMS, Inc.,98 addressed the copyrightability of text-based application program screen displays. MTI sued CAMS, alleging that CAMS'
cost estimating program, "Quick Cost" (Quick Cost) infringed the
screen display copyrights held by MTI for its cost estimating program,
"Costimator" (Costimator). The defendants had been employed by MTI
as salesmen, were trained in the use of MTI's program, had access to
the display and user manuals, and possessed a Costimator demonstration program. 99 MTI had expended approximately 3,000 man-hours cre93. Id. at 154.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. One commentator has suggested that the Copyright Office position "places developers desiring to protect their screens at the mercy of courts that might follow the Softkione precedent." Note, Copyright Protectionfor Computer Screen Displays, 72 MINN. L.
REV. 1123, 1143 (1988).

However, Softklone involved a developer who had obtained a

Copyright registration on the display screen. Because obtaining such a registration is no
longer possible, software developers who have designed display screens subsequent to the
Office's decision to no longer register display screens should be able to factually distinguish their cases from Softklone, thereby preventing a court from denying screen protection through the program copyright.
97. See infra notes 98-138 and accompanying text.
98. 706 F. Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989).
99. Id. at 988.
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ating Costimator, but testimony indicated that CAMS spent just 1,500
man-hours creating Quick Cost.'00 MTI had obtained copyright registrations on the Costimator programs and some of the display screens,
thereby placing the burden upon CAMS to prove the noncopyrightability of the display screens.'x0
Costimator sold for approximately $20,000; the defendants sold
Quick Cost for between $1,000 and $2,000, while overstating their program's performance capabilities.' 0 2 As a defense, CAMS alleged that
the Costimator screen displays did not contain copyrightable subject
matter.
2.

The Opinion

Judge T.F. Gilroy Daly noted from the outset that "[w]hether a
copyright in a computer program extends to its screen displays has been
the subject of some confusion and disagreement.' 0 3 After explaining
that the copyright problem was created by the ability of two completely
different computer programs to create identical, or nearly identical,
04
screens, Judge Daly pointed out that only two courts, Broderbund1
and Softklone, 0 5 had addressed the copyrightability of screen displays.
Judge Daly separated the issue into two schools of thought. The first
school favored broad protection for screen displays, and extended program copyright protection only to the "literal" elements of the program
code. 10 6 The second school favored withholding copyright protection
from user interfaces, such as screen displays or the sequence and
structure of a program, because those elements are uncopyrightable
functional elements or ideas. 10 7 Judge Daly also suggested that the
Copyright Office's decision-that it will not register screen displays
100. Id. at 988, 990.

101. M. Kramer Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 434 (4th Cir. 1986).
102. CAMS, 706 F. Supp. at 990.

103. Id.
104. Judge Daly, like preceding courts and commentators, believed that the
Broderbundcourt improperly interpreted Whelan when it held that 9helan stood for the
proposition that a computer program protects the screen displays generated by that pro-

gram. Id. at 992.
105. Judge Daly interpreted Softklone as holding that copyright protection in a computer program does not extend to its screen displays, but that a separate copyright regis-

tration in a screen display could be infringed by a defendant whose screen captured the
"total concept and feel" of the plaintiff's. Id.
106. Id. at 993.
107. CAMS, 706 F. Supp. at 991 n.12 (citing Plains Cotton Coop, v. Goodpasture Com-

puter Serv., 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 80 (1987) (supporting the
second "school of thought")). Plains held that the organizational similarity between
plaintiff's and defendant's programs was not sufficient to constitute infringement because
market factors played a significant role in determining the sequence and organization of

the software. Plains,807 F.2d at 1256.
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separately-threatens the validity of the Softklone holding that a program copyright does not protect the screen displays generated by that
program.

l0 8

3. Reconciling the Copyright Office Conflict
As its approach to the problem, the CAMS Court decided to "treat
the single registration of the computer program as accomplishing two
interrelated yet distinct registrations; [sic] one of the program itself and
one of the screen displays or user interface of that program, to the extent that each contains copyrightable subject matter."' 1 9 By creating
the legal fiction of two separate registrations, the court hoped to facilitate the extraction of the copyrightable expression from each registration and avoid confusing a program's idea with that of a screen display
idea.110
CAMS defended the infringement claim by asserting that the nature of the cost estimating screen displays was such that the available
manners of expressing the screens' ideas were limited (merger), that
the screens were uncopyrightable "forms," and that the screens lacked
the requisite "originality" to be copyrightable."' Judge Daly held that
112
the defendants' arguments must be applied to the screen displays
both as to the "flow and sequencing" of the screens, and to the screens
3
individually."
108. CAMS, 706 F. Supp. at 992.
109. Id. at 993.
110. The court created the "legal fiction" of two separate registrations, which it be-

lieved recognized that:
[A] computer program and its screen displays are, for copyright purposes, funda-

mentally distinct. The computer program and any authorship contained therein
is designed to organize and direct the computer to efficiently perform a particular
task when properly directed by the user. While the user interface is designed to
communicate with the user in a way to facilitate the understanding and use of
the program itself. This approach conforms to the realitiesof Copyright OffJce
registrationprocedures.
Id. (emphasis added). The "legal fiction" approach does conform to Copyright Office registration procedures as far as it allows screen display protection to flow from a program
copyright registration. However, why create more confusion through a "legal fiction?" If
the court thought it important to conform to the Office registration procedures, it could
have accomplished that result merely by applying the Office position that the program
copyright covers any copyrightable authorship in the screen displays, without creating a
"legal fiction."
111. Id.
112. The screen displays were registered as "compilations." Id.
113. Id. at 994.
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"Mow and Sequencing" Copyright

Certain specific aspects of the cost estimating screens were found
by the court to be dictated by functional considerations, and, therefore,
uncopyrightable. 1 1 4 Thus, merger was available as a defense because a
limited number of ways existed by which the defendants could express
certain aspects of cost estimating.
Expert testimony was presented indicating that the entire "flow
and sequencing" of the cost estimating screens was not solely functional.1 1L5 Judge Daly was persuaded by this testimony, and, consequently, held that the "flow and sequencing" of the screens was, in fact,
6
copyrightable."
5. Copyright of "Common" Aspects of Individual Screens
In CAMS, MTI also argued that its screen display formatting style
was protected. Specifically, MTI wanted protection for: (1) centered
identification headings at the top of each screen display; (2) location of
commands at the bottom of each screen ("bottom-line" programming);
and (3) placement of the function to be selected in the middle of the
screen. 117 The court correctly noted that "the placement of common
screen components in certain specific locations is limited by several constraints." 118 The plaintiff's formatting style was held noncopyrightable
because that style had been selected "from a very narrow range of
possibilities." 119
The court applied the same reasoning when it rejected plaintiff's
claim that its "navigational" method-the use of certain keys for cursor
movement or function selection-was copyright protected. Another
reason given for rejecting the "navigational" claim was the fact that the
114. Id.
115. Judge Daly found it dispositive that:
While there is evidence to show that some of the specific operations performed
are functional in nature, there is none save defendants' expert testimony that the
overall process and flow of these screens is driven solely by functional considerations. However, that same expert candidly admitted that cost-estimating is part
science and part art. Also, plaintiff adduced testimony from four different expert witnesses, all experienced in cost-estimating, that the process of creating a
cost-estimate is unique to the individual manually performing the estimate or
the computer program and screen displays assisting the same.
Id. (emphasis added).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 994-95.
118. Id. at 995.
119. Id. (citing Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble, Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967);
Affiliated Hosp. Prods., Inc. v. Merdel Game Mfg. Co., 513 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1975)) (both
"rules and instructions" cases).
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120
type of computer used dictated the method of screen "navigation.'
The only aspect common to all of the screen displays held copyrightable
was the plaintiff's method of identifying the "operation or department"
being used. The court found expression in the plaintiff's style because
the characteristics of the identification method were not a "necessary
incident" to the idea of apprising the user of his efforts in cost12
estimating. '

6.

Copyright of Specific Screens

Some of the individual screen displays were held copyrightable, but
most of those displays were held not copyrightable because the court
considered the expression to be a necessary incident to the idea.122 A
"job identification" screen was held copyrightable. The plaintiff's "redundancy" in the screen was evidence of expression that was not a
"necessary incident" to the idea. The court also found the "job identification" screen sufficiently original to be copyrightable. 123 Finally, the
court found that while the "job identification" screen was a blank form,
it "conveyed information" as required by Baker v. Selden l2 4 and thus
was copyrightable. The screen was found to "convey information" because it suggested that identifying a job involved many factors, and that
"certain attributes of the part to be manufactured need to be considered
when identifying a particular job, because those attributes will affect
125
the derivation of an estimate.'
Two of MTI's screen displays were held copyrightable because
CAMS did not offer testimony to rebut the presumption of copyright
validity created by the screen registration. 126 Given the Copyright Office position that program registration protects the screen, courts are
now faced with determining whether program registrations create a
120. CAMS, 706 F. Supp. at 995. The "navigational" method was held uncopyrightable,
regardless of whether the method involved use of certain keys or a menu.
121. Id. at 996.
122. A two-column alphabetical listing of departments was held to involve expression
that was a necessary incident to the idea of the listing, and to lack originality. Id. at 996.
A four-column display used for the input of information on a calculation screen was held
not copyrightable because it involved "facts." Financial Info. v. Moody's Investor's Serv.,
808 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987). Aspects of the calculation
screen such as the columnar format and the use of both upper and lower case letters were

held nonoriginal, and thus noncopyrightable. CAMS, 706 F. Supp. at 996. Also, a "listing
of items for which data [was] supplied" was held noncopyrightable because the items were
necessary incidents to the idea of cost-estimating. Finally, the court held several screens
noncopyrightable merely because the plaintiff "offered no specific claim of protection or

evidence." Id. at 997.
123. Id. at 996-97.
124. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
125. CAMS, 706 F. Supp. at 997.
126. Id.
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presumption of display screen copyright validity. Presumably, the
Copyright Office will review screen displays when deciding whether to
issue registrations for the underlying program. Consequently, if program registration is granted, the Office may be assumed to have determined that the screen displays were also copyrightable, and, therefore,
entitled to the presumption of validity.
7. Copying
The court had little difficulty finding "access" when it was faced
with considering whether CAMS had copied MTI's screen displays because of the CAMS principals' actions. The CAMS principals had: (1)
been employed by MTI as salesmen; (2) seen the displays screens; and
(3) possessed user manuals with copies of the screen displays. As for
the question of "substantial similarity," the court used the 2nd Circuit
"spontaneous response of the ordinary lay observer" test, but noted
that, in a complex case such as the one before the court, expert testimony may be considered. 127 The six experts who testified for MTI
unanimously concluded that the CAMS screen displays could not have
been created independently of the MTI screen displays. 128 Besides
"striking overall stylistic and format similarity," the experts found that
both programs used terminology not common to the trade, both consistently used upper and lower case letters with respect to certain terms,
"group segmentation" similarity, 12 9 navigational similarity, 30 and common "redundancies.' 131 Thus, the "sequence and flow" of the CAMS
screens displays was held substantially similar to that of the MTI
screens.
Moreover, the CAMS method of expressing the user's status while
conducting a cost-estimate was held substantially similar to the corresponding MTI method. Finally, as to individual screens, the court found
one of the CAMS screens substantially similar to its corresponding MTI
screen. 132 The CAMS court based its finding of copyright infringement
primarily upon the defendant's copying of the overall "sequence and
flow" of the plaintiff's program, rather than copying of individual
127. Id. at 1000.
128. Id
129. In both programs, the grouping of terms was not based on frequency of use of
those terms, as is commonly done. Id.
130. Navigational similarity is the use of the same keys to move through the program.
Id.
131.

There is also evidence that the defendant's copying went so far as to duplicate the

misspelled words in the plaintiff's screen displays. See Simon, Software Owner Wins
"Look and Feel" Victory, Boston Globe, Mar. 14, 1989, Economy section, at 43.
132. The "job identification" screen was found substantially similar. CAMS, 706 F.
Supp. at 1001.
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8. Remedy
Judge Daly found the defendant's infringement of the plaintiff's
screen displays willful 134 and, therefore, granted a permanent injunction based upon a probability of continuing infringement. 135 The injunction was to be "on such terms as [the court] may deem reasonable
to prevent or restrain infringement of [the] copyright.' 136 Consequently, the court permanently enjoined the defendants from "engaging
in or facilitating the manufacturing, advertising, selling, leasing, or licensing of the infringing... series of programs. ' 137 The permanent injunction will, in all likelihood, be more damaging to the defendants
than the permanent injunction in Softklone, which caused minimal difficulty for the defendant. 38 But note, the "flow and sequencing" of the
screen displays in CAMS, along with certain individual displays themselves, cannot be infringed. Thus, the CAMS defendants will have much
more difficulty revising their screen displays to avoid infringement than
the Softklone defendants, who were forced only to change some of the
aesthetic characteristics of a single screen.
It is unclear, given the flexibility of computer technology, what effect the permanent injunction issued by the court will have upon the
defendant. CAMS does not solve any of the problems that exist in "look
and feel" copyright cases. In fact, the case will probably be cited by
both plaintiffs and defendants in the future.
VI.

PENDING CASES

Amid the uncertainty that has prevailed regarding the "look and
feel" copyright of computer screen displays, several plaintiffs have entered the fray with new "look and feel" lawsuits. Apple is suing
Microsoft and Hewlett Packard, claiming infringement of the "look and
feel" of Apple's menu/window/mouse graphic interface. Ashton-Tate,
creator of the "dBASE" (dBASE) database program is suing Foxbase
Software, alleging both that Foxbase infringed the "look and feel" of
dBASE, and that Ashton-Tate owns the computer language used by the
dBASE program. Finally, Lotus Corp., maker of the spreadsheet "LO133. Id. at 1002.
134. Judge Daly found that the defendants had "actual knowledge" of their infringing
conduct, and thus the infringement was "willful." CAMS, 706 F. Supp. at 1002 (citing Fitzgerald Pub. Co. v. Baylor Pub. Co., 807 F.2d 1110, 1115 (2d Cir. 1986)).
135. CAMS, 706 F. Supp. at 1002.
136. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1988).
137. CAMS, 706 F. Supp. at 1006.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86 (discussion of Softklone remedy).
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TUS 1-2-3" (LOTUS 1-2-3) is suing Mosaic Software and Paperback
Software International, alleging infringement of the "look and feel" of
LOTUS 1-2-3. The software giants, it seems, have gone "look and feel"
crazy.
Some industry observers claim that the lawsuits are an attempt by
software developers to stop, through the courts, the success of innovative, more efficient "clone" programs which are beginning to capture
large shares of the software market. Basically, Apple, Lotus, and Ashton-Tate are being beaten where it counts-in the software market-so
the three have decided to switch the battlefield from the market to the
139
courts, where deeper pockets often prevail.
The Apple and Lotus lawsuits have received substantial media attention, but by far the biggest newsmaker of the three has been AshtonTate, which has taken beatings from both the press and computer user
groups. 140 Still, some of the negative characterizations of Ashton-Tate
by the media could be a carryover from its general negative business
image. 141 One computer columnist has even urged dBASE user groups
to put pressure upon Ashton-Tate to drop its lawsuit (and, instead, use
its legal funds for product innovation), and has also encouraged users to
create a legal defense fund for Fox Software. 142 Media and computer
user disagreement with the positions of the plaintiffs in the pending
"look and feel" lawsuits does not, of course, necessarily mean that the
plaintiffs do not have valid claims of infringement. It should be recognized that computer publications are written for computer users-not
139. See Freedman, Ashton-Tate Defends dBASE Turf, PC WEEK, Nov. 28, 1988, at 1;
O'Connor, Software Giant Suing Competitors, Chicago Tribune, Dec. 18, 1988, § 7, at 4,
col. 1 (with regard to Ashton-Tate's lawsuit, the author stated that "what appears to be a
business looking out for its rights" is actually "a bully trying to quash the competition and
frighten the customer while diverting attention away from its inept efforts to improve its
product.").
Another author has observed that
"the legal thorn patch through which it seems Ashton-Tate intends to drag Fox
Software is the last and final resort to a problem that the company has not yet
resolved: How to stay technically competitive while being bested by smarter
companies that have built a better mousetrap; how to recover from its inability to
improve the dBASE language while other, smaller companies are doing precisely
that."
Ray, Ashton-Tate's Lawsuit is Masking the Real Problem; Behind the Lines, PC WEEK,
Dec. 26, 1988, at 37.
140. Much of the negative press focuses on Ashton-Tate's claim to ownership of the
copyright in the dBASE language. See, e.g., Adams, dBASE Users: Don't Take It!, PC
WORLD, Apr. 1989, at 268.
141. Analysts note that "Ashton-Tate hasn't yet proven its a company for tomorrow,"
and "Tate bashing is kind of a sport. Everyone has been doing it for so long they just
don't know how to stop." Rebello, Its Software Has Fans, if A-T Doesn't, USA Today,
Mar. 28, 1989, at 3B, col. 3.
142. Bunnell, To Sue, Perchance to Win, PC WORLD, Mar. 1989, at 43-44.
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the software industry--and to a certain extent articles reflect the views
of the readers, who want inexpensive software and interface standardization. Computer users probably could not care less whether the copyright laws are serving the purpose of promoting progress in the arts and
sciences by balancing competing interests.
A major problem with Ashton-Tate's claim that it owns dBASE is
evidence that the dBASE language was derived from "JPLDIS"
(JPLDIS), a computer program developed at a Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and from Vulcan, a program based on JPLDIS.143 Ashton-Tate
could formulate an argument that the dBASE language was based on,
and transformed from, a preexisting work, and, therefore, is a "derivative work."'144
Apple faces a similar problem in its lawsuit. Apple claims copyright protection for its menu/window/mouse graphic interface, but
there is evidence that Xerox developed that idea in the 1970s. 1 45 Apple,

of course, is expected to claim that its expression of that idea is what
merits copyright protection. The defendants will probably argue that
"merger" exists because there is a limited number of ways that the idea
of a menu/window/mouse graphic interface may be expressed. Considering the lack of success the defendants in Broderbund,Softklone, and
CAMS had with the merger defense, the Apple defendants would be
well advised to concentrate on other defenses.
One of the defendants in a pending case, Fox Software, has turned
the tables and mounted its own offense in the form of several counterclaims. These counterclaims allege trade secret misappropriation, unfair competition, and Sherman Act violations by Ashton-Tate. Unlike
the other defendants, Fox is in the fortunate position of having substantial evidence that Ashton-Tate encouraged Fox to copy the dBASE program and "look and feel" in order to establish dBASE as the industry
standard. 1 46 Ashton-Tate has responded that it encouraged software
companies to create applications for the dBASE software, but at no time
did it encourage anyone to copy the entire "look and feel" of its dBASE
software.

1 47

143. Fox Software, Fox Software Open Letter to dBASE Language Community Regarding Fox Software and Ashton-Tate Litigation,Business Wire, Dec. 13, 1988 (Business Wire
is available on the NEXIS database).
144. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
145. Xerox employees devoted about thirty "work-years" to the development of the interface, and worked on the interface for two years before any software for operating the
interface was developed. Smith, Irby, Kimball, Verplank & Harslem, Designing the Star
User Interface, BYTE, Apr. 1982, at 242, 246.
146. See Fox Software, supra note 143.
147. David Cole, Ashton-Tate's CEO from 1982 to 1984 publicly stated that "[w]e actively encouraged developers to write applications in the dBASE language, and we encouraged people to use our file format ....
[blut at no time did we encourage anyone to
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As far as the pending Lotus case is concerned, many observers believe that the CAMS case will greatly help Lotus. 148 The plaintiff in the
149
CAMS case used at least one expert suggested by Lotus and IBM.

In the high stakes computer software world, it is no wonder that
the major players of the game are scrambling to protect their positions
by stopping competitors through the courts. The U.S. controls 70% of
the worldwide software market, which amounted to about $50 billion in
1988.150 Overseas sales of U.S. computer software amounted to about
$11 billion in 1988.151 If U.S. software developers are to remain competitive worldwide, innovative advances in software must continue. But
with developers mired in an uncertain legal climate, technological advances may be stifled because of fear of overstepping the boundaries of
copyright law. 152 For the moment, it appears that the courts, which

have only recently been faced with copyright "look and feel" issues, will
continue to balance the competing interests involved in this area. Unfortunately, the slow pace of the judicial system may allow the confusion to exist long enough to cause a reduction in the U.S. share of the
world software market. For that reason, some observers have suggested
that Congress take action. 153 Presently, no such action is foreseeable.
VII.

CONCLUSION

As Broderbund,Softklone, and CAMS demonstrate, courts are willing to find that certain aspects of computer application program displays are "original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of
expression" and, therefore, copyrightable under the federal Copyright
Act. That willingness should not be allowed to erode into a general belief that all computer application program display screens are copyrightable. After all, computer programs are inherently functional. Granting
appropriate or mimic the entire product." Freedman, Fox Software Suit ChargesAshton-

Tate Copyright is Invalid, PC WEEK, Dec. 19, 1988, at 63, 64.
148. Henry B. Gutman, the lawyer who represents Lotus, stated that the CAMS case
was "very helpful and one I am sure we will cite to the court." Simon, supra note 131, at
43.
149. Id.
150. O'Connor, Patent Fever Sweeps Software: Developers Trying New Avenues to Protect Programs,Chicago Tribune, Mar. 20, 1989, § 4, at 8, col. 1.
151. Wiegner & Heins, supra note 75, at 136.
152. Daniel Bricklin, co-creator of the spreadsheet Visicaic, who now operates a small
software company, has stated that "I am not looking at certain products because I don't
want to be accused later of having copied them." Simon, supra note 131, at 43.
153. Kathleen Wiegner & John Heins, the authors of the Forbes article, Can Las
Vegas Sue Atlantic City?, have suggested that Congress create a separate software protection system, taking elements from both patent and copyright law. Their system would allow "look and feel" copying, but prohibit copying of program code. Also, the time of
protection would be shortened to 10 years. See Wiegner & Heins, supra note 75, at 136.
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a monopoly through copyright protection for the "best" way to accomplish a task should be avoided. The difficulty, of course, stems from determining when someone is seeking to copyright the "best" method.
Such a determination will unavoidably be subjective. One way to avoid
the creation of monopoly rights through the copyright of the "best" way
to accomplish a task is to focus, as the courts have, on the "expression"
contained in the computer display screens. However, future courts
should hold that two aspects of computer application program screen
displays are presumed incapable of containing "expression." This presumption, of course, would be rebuttable by plaintiffs, and would further require that a court hold that a program copyright registration
creating a presumption of screen copyright validity extend to all aspects
of the copyright except expression.
The first aspect is the sequencing and ordering of screen displays.
More often than not, there exists a very limited number of ways that
screens may be organized in order to efficiently perform a task. Absent
evidence by a plaintiff that screen organization is unrelated to efficiency, courts should hold that screen sequencing and ordering is
noncopyrightable. Otherwise, the limited number of ways to efficiently
computerize a task would soon become monopolized, thereby stifling
competition and incentive to create.
The second aspect is the positioning of text on the display screen.
Again, there is often a very limited number of screen positions available
for the efficient placement of text and commands. Plaintiffs who claim
copyright in the position of text on a screen should be forced to come
forward with evidence that text position is unrelated to efficient completion of the computerized task. Copyright protection for text positioning, just as for screen organization, is undesirable because of the
potential monopoly effects.
Creating a presumption of noncopyrightability of screen organization and text position could lead to increased standardization in the
computer industry. Computer users would become accustomed to the
organization of screen displays and the screen positions of various text
commands. Once users become accustomed to these general computer
characteristics, users will enhance their ability to transfer computer
skills to other brands of software. Furthermore, software manufacturers will have an incentive to periodically enhance the functionality of
their software because they will not be able to rely upon user familiarity with their screen display for second-time sales.
Creating a rebuttable presumption of noncopyrightability of screen
organization and text position provides a limited amount of standardization, and, at the same time, allows for protection when those aspecis of
a screen display indeed contain expression worthy of copyright
protection.

